That strategy failed almost immediately, and I came to understand that the material I was receiving on the "margins" of my intended research project was actually bringing me closer to an understanding of the complex factors that contribute to the religious identity of individuals and whole religious communities, including phenomena of "post memory." 5 As a result, in my attempts to seek reactions and feedback among people living in the borderlands, I became an "instrument of knowing," 6 using my own background and my national and religious identities as a kind of research tool.
Wherever they conduct their fieldwork, anthropologists are often perceived as someone positioned "betwixt and between." We act as mediators between various local actors, and the texts we produce are aimed at mediating between the communities we study, academia, and broader contexts. In conducting my fieldwork, publishing the early results, and going back to the area for follow-up research, I
could also see how my presence influenced the space and the relations between different categories of my respondents-in some cases, to the point of causing tension between neighbors. As a result, maintaining a diplomatic stance was a considerable challenge. As Jeremy Morris argues in his emphasis on the role of fieldworker as diplomat, "Fieldwork relations themselves can serve as a useful sites to explore how 5 Marianne Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," Poetics Today 29, no. 1 (2008):103-28. According to Hirsch, who coined this term, postmemory uses histories, images, and behavioral patterns of those who experience collective or cultural trauma, transmitting it to the next generation(s): "Postmemory describes the relationship that the generation after those who witnessed cultural or collective trauma bears to the experiences of those who came before, experiences that they 'remember' only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right." (106-7). 6 Sherry B. Ortner, "Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal," Comparative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 1 (1995) : 173.
notions of political eventfulness are incorporated into the everyday." 7 Given the methodological and ethical difficulties involved in the study, reflexive anthropology provided me with important guidance in my role as the researcher and my relation to the context in which I was working.
8
Given the high number of multiple-site international studies on the subject, 9 the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands might seem like a well-researched area. However, my work soon made me realize that this region continues to hold considerable research potential on a variety of topics connected with conflicting memories (including state policies of memory), religious culture, nationalism, and routine survival strategies that may be slow to respond to the changing administrative nature of the border between Ukraine and Poland as an EU member.
10
These routine strategies are tightly connected with the grassroots modes of dealing with "others"-that is, both the "domestic others" (neighbors of other ethnic origins and denominations) and the "foreign others" coming to eastern Poland from Ukraine. In this article, I intend to analyze such modes, including those that Hence, everyday diplomacy refers to a set of practices that hold together social relations between categorically different social actors in a specific context. 13 A focus on everyday diplomacy makes it possible for me to, on the one hand, respond to the challenges and unexpected issues the field throws at me, and, on the other hand, to engage in anthropological research that moves beyond local, nation-state, or confessional frames to consider how the current political discourse in Poland and Ukraine shapes religious practices, issues of memory, and perceptions of history in local communities near Przemyśl more broadly.
LOCATIONS, PEOPLE, AND RELATIONS WITHIN THE FIELD
A brief introduction to the historical context of the relationships within the communities under discussion might be in order. Without going too deeply into the complicated history of Polish-Ukrainian relationships, which go back to early I will focus predominantly on my observations and interactions with people in several villages near Przemyśl. In the town of Przemyśl itself, there were only two main respondents (one male and one female, both self-identified as Ukrainian Greek Catholics) with whom I had a considerable amount of interaction. People in the area felt quite vulnerable, mostly declining to be recorded during interviews. 29 It was therefore vital to preserve their total anonymity and to conceal their addresses.
In general terms, the four villages were located in the Fredropol district (gmina). Catholic or Roman Catholic neighborhoods before World War II, the replies I got were often evasive: "I don't remember," "My mother remembers but she wouldn't talk to you," "That was a long time ago; I've got nothing to say," "You should ask the chaplain whether he would give me permission to talk to you." Małgorzata Wosińska, in her work on the collective traumatic memory in a formerly diverse local community in Lithuania, regards those kinds of negative answers as indicative of a latent conflict between neighbors-possibly no longer outwardly visible, but still very palpable.
30
The following examples are illustrative of my field experiences. After interacting with me for two years, two respondents who had always self-identified as Roman
Catholic Poles confessed to me that they each had at least one Ukrainian parent or grandparent. Both emphatically asked me not to share that information with anyone because they felt the information posed a potential threat to them. One person born in 1962 said this to explain why disclosing this kind of information felt uncomfortable: "I don't want anyone from the IPN 31 to come sniffing around for my family's past." The other instance was even more poignant. A Greek Catholic respondent with whom I' d had some long, deep conversations, during which we had opened up to each other on many occasions, told me during my last trip that in the almost two years of our acquaintance he had been afraid to interact with me and actually entertained the possibility that I might be a "Russian agent" sent to Poland on some kind of underhanded mission. Born near Przemyśl in the 1950s, after his parents returned from Western Pomerania, following the forcible resettlement in Action Vistula (1947) , that most agreeable man was a recognizable figure in the local Greek Catholic community. He was heavily involved with matters connected with neglected sacred places important to the Greek Catholic Poland that functions as a body of state and judiciary administration, combining the curation of archives with research work and educational projects. Since 2007, the IPN also conducts vetting procedures on candidates for public office (based on information from the institute's official page, https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-ipn/2,Institute-of-National-Remembrance-Commission-for-the-Prosecution-of-Crimes-again.html).
community dating back to the prewar period. When we first met in the summer of 2015, I asked a series of questions about a pilgrimage site that once played a major role for Greek Catholics before World War II and that had been vandalized almost ten years after the war 32 -the man became visibly anxious. I later realized that his fear was connected with his own efforts to revive the pilgrimage site for Ukrainians: the last thing he wanted was any sort of conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, the local authorities, his Polish neighbors, or anyone else. Sensing his anxiety, I tried to put him at ease and insisted that he and his family would be safe from harm, that no audio recording would be made of our conversation, and that his anonymity would be protected. When we talked for the last time, the man told me that in the intervening two years he had been gathering information about me and now felt safer communicating with me. What persuaded him that I was not a Russian special service agent was an article I' d published in Polish in an academic journal he read, coupled with his personal contact with a colleague of mine from Warsaw. In one sense, I found that experience profoundly unsettling, but in another, it gave me plenty of food for thought on how to gain a better understanding of my Ukrainian respondents' imaginaries of Russia as a "third force" ("third actor") that exerted a malign influence on Polish-Ukrainian relations both at the level of national politics and in the daily lives of local communities in Polish Subcarpathia.
Perceptions of this "third force" is a major research problem, calling for systematic study that goes beyond the scope of this article. However, it needs to be point- Poland. 36 Writing about the need to rethink the romanticized idea of a peaceful "multicultural neighborhood," Agnieszka Pasieka has pointed out that "such a view usually regards the period of interwar Poland and depicts the situation in the eastern or southeastern borderlands of Poland at the time. And it is usually the representative of the then dominant group-Poles-that presents such a view." 37 She emphasizes the need to "pay attention to the 'neighborhood' itself, and not only on its 'multireligious' or 'multiethnic' character," taking into account "the grassroots meaning of neighborhood," which covers "practices of mutual respect and cooperation … regardless of people's religious and ethnic identity." 38 Similarly, Magdalena Lubanska believes that routine neighborly relations should be seen as "a bottom-up cultural strategy … which needs to be affirmed in everyday relationships of reciprocity." 39 Relying on these studies and on my own data, I believe that a focus on micro-level cases and everyday grassroots strategies of coexistence allows us to capture the ways in which people understand the past in their localities, how they perceive their erstwhile and current neighbors alongside whom they live, and how they are reconciled with, or simply cope with, memories that can be contested and politicized.
During my two years of fieldwork trips, I had inadvertently taken on the peculiar role of a "third person" standing between the Poles and the Ukrainians, burdened
with their expectation that I should write "the right things" about their communities in "an appropriate way." This was particularly apparent among the Ukrainian local community. My respondents generously introduced me to new potential interlocutors who were their relatives or friends, and sometimes came with me to services at the main Greek Catholic Cathedral of St. John the Baptist in Przemyśl.
Nearly every new person I was introduced to was surprised by my project and demanded to know why I, a person with no roots or family connections to Subcarpathia, would want to write about the interreligious intersections in the area; and that being the case, they felt that as a Ukrainian I needed to write "the truth" about the Greek Catholic community in this region, which continued to feel threatened.
That feeling was strengthened by numerous incidents related to the activity of nationalistic groups in Poland. 40 Thus, trauma not only was present at the level of discourse but also found expression in my research challenges in the field, as well as in my respondents themselves-in how they related to the past and how they related to me-which was indicative of the general atmosphere of distrust. This trauma became a new research problem for me since the polyphony of coexistence I was witnessing was grounded in mutual past traumas. For me, maintaining an entirely neutral stance turned out to be impossible since all my fieldwork relationships were affected by an ongoing war in Ukraine and an economic crisis that had produced a large influx of Ukrainian workers in the area, as well as by the "management of historical policy" by Poland and Ukraine and their respective public discourses on "national heroes," in which the two groups' views intrinsically clashed with each other. I had anticipated that either nation's heroes were the other nation's foes, but I had never experienced how such officially mandated "historical policies" (including "politics of memory") could impact the everyday lives of ordinary people in local communities on the periphery. 
THREE STRATEGIES OF COEXISTENCE: FORGIVE, FORGET, OR FEIGN
National history narratives produced in Poland and Ukraine overlook, and sometimes contradict, the often complex and highly ambivalent memories and everyday experiences of people living in the borderlands. 41 Those are based on the multiplicity of "plural pasts," 42 often experienced not by my respondents but by their parents or grandparents, which I believe need to be examined by applying the category of postmemory to the study of the diverse local communities in the area. Juraj Buzalka emphasizes that, in particular, "memories of violence are highly political and contested; they are recalled by individuals and groups especially when the memories are tied to national and religious policies and ideologies." In this context, I see a considerable potential for the idea of everyday diplomacy as a mode for living with the ghosts of the past in a way that makes it possible to deal with "domestic others" and to acknowledge difference in proximity. As far as I can tell, this approach expresses itself through three strategies of coexistence, which I refer to as forgive, forget, and feign. To interpret those three modes, which I note in the oral narratives as provisional categories, I also took into account the context in which they were produced (how people viewed me, how they were able or unable to trust me and share information) and their symbolic meaning. This context, which I described in part above, becomes particularly interesting when it provides an insight into the hidden roots of these peoples' coexistence and their varying viewpoints. The same woman also told me that she believed it was the right thing to do to light a candle at every abandoned grave, Polish or Ukrainian, when visiting a cemetery on All Saints' Day. In our conversations, she made frequent references to passages from the liturgy and prayer, telling me that it was "her duty as a Christian" to for-
give.
The second strategy of coexistence is forgetting (or avoiding) the past. In this case, I rely on the respondents' conviction that forgetting offers a way to achieve reconciliation. As one Orthodox man of Ukrainian origin noted:
In order to survive, I had to become a different person. My parents were Ukrainians and they were resettled from our village. I remember nothing of that. I was a little kid at that time. I can only remember the church, I used to sing in a choir. … I wanted to study, to serve in the army, and so I had to become a Pole. He was quite emphatic about the fact that he felt no resentment toward Poles-so much so, in fact, that his insistence on having almost forgotten his family past gave me reason to doubt his veracity. There's a difference between actually forgetting and wanting to forget. But when I came across similar opinions on several occasions, I also realized that there was a certain pattern at work here: with Poles as well as
Ukrainians, believing that they needed "to live as they do," and choose to forget was a deliberate strategy of neighborly coexistence. Some were, in fact, too young to remember the events of World War II and its aftermath in the region. However, they insisted even the traumatic postmemory in their families had no influence on them:
We live normally here. I personally don't want to dig in the past, I don't want to know who did more of the killing: Lubanska uses the concept of a "strategy of silence," 49 which to me seems an apt description that frames this particular mode of coexistence.
I find that this strategy of silence is more palpable in the Ukrainian communitiesboth Orthodox and Greek Catholic-which share a strong sense of victimization at the hands of the majority. However, Orthodox believers were not particularly eager to argue the point with me. Their usual formula was "we've gotten used to it all" or "we've got churches of our own, and that's all that matters." However, this is obviously not "all that matters" for my Greek Catholic respondents, even if they tend to argue to outsiders like me that they bear no grudges and the past "had gone":
My father wasn't a member of the UPA, we just were ordinary people, as were most of the villagers! … Do you know that this village used to be entirely The notion that "we're all Christians" is also quite typical of Roman Catholic Poles.
I was told on numerous occasions that, compared to Muslims, it was "better" to have Greek Catholics and Orthodox as neighbors, since "they are also Christians."
This idea would emerge in conversations about marriages between Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics, which tended to be quite emotional. Generally, my respondents in all categories (i.e., forgiving, forgetting, and feigning) had tolerant views on mixed marriages between Ukrainians and Poles, insisting that "feelings know no borders" and "our children should live as they want." But as a rule, Poles and Ukrainians alike are unhappy, not so much because their children enter mixed marriages, but rather that their children might change their religious rite after marriage. Of course, my Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Orthodox respondents were aware that practicing endogamy was hardly possible these days. However, Greek Catholics and Orthodox Christians would claim that it was difficult to preserve their confessional group as a minority, so it was important to find a partner in the same Church and to raise children in "one faith," or at least one Byzantine rite. In turn, Roman Catholics would say that both Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy were "very beautiful," "inspiring," or even "magical" cultural phenomena, but the Roman Catholic Church was "more developed" and connected with the Vatican, amounting to a "civilizational choice." I also noticed that some of my Roman
Catholic respondents were not aware that Greek Catholicism was likewise part of the Catholic Church and thus recognize the authority of the Vatican. To the local Roman Catholics, both the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox rites were perceived positively in the terms of "beautiful liturgy," "inspiring church singing," and so on, but at the same time were seen as "alien," "Eastern," "not common to Polish culture." I tend to perceive such an attitude as a form of exotization because members of the dominant group view the religious culture of the neighboring minority groups as a kind of curious ethnographic attraction.
I propose that the Greek Catholic and Orthodox communities don't warrant this stereotypical exotization; however, they are marginalized partly because of their own on-going narrative of their community's collective trauma. This is highly palpable in the Greek Catholic community, which cherishes its image of victimization.
Having been present at some Greek Catholic services on big holidays like Easter The kinds of social reflection that I could make out from their replies, which were sometimes indirect and oblique rather than straightforward and literal, might be 50 Referring to Buzalka's monograph published ten years ago, I conclude that little has changed since then. He quotes the words spoken by a local Greek Catholic priest during Mass: "Action Vistula took place more than fifty years ago, but in my opinion, it is still going on" (Buzalka, Nation and Religion, 55) . I've heard many variations on that opinion, especially from first-and second-generation people who returned to Subcarpathia from western and northern Poland. However, a deeper insight into this issue goes beyond the scope of this article. 51 Olga Solarz, "O sztuce wychodzenia z deportacyjnego wagonu." Kwartalnik "Więź" 2 (668) Those respondents as well as younger ones would also say that they might enjoy various concerts and festivals in Bieszczady that presented the "cultural heritage" of their region. I propose that those modes of social practice are precisely the forms of reflection that don't emphasize problems of ethnicity or nationality, but rather address the immediate, everyday context, symptomatic of bottom-up cooperation and leisure. Along with various volunteer activities, small business ventures, and routine interactions I mention above, such an approach contributes to the difficult and long-term process of coming to terms with the past in the region of Subcarpathia.
CONCLUSIONS
The research on religious practices in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands in the area of Subcarpathia opens up another set of important research questions connected with overlapping memories that tend to be highly contested and politicized in the public discourses of both Poland and Ukraine. Those memories became visible to me in the process of research both through religious expressions and through those modes of dealing with the past and elaborating on neighborly coexistence that could be framed as "everyday diplomacy." In this article, I use the term "everyday diplomacy" to refer to a number of routine grassroots strategies for living alongside neighbors with different ethnic (national) identities and religious denominations under the burden of contested memories that go back to World War II and its aftermath. Participation in neighborly relationships is strengthened by the impact the media have on people's everyday life in local communities, reviving the contradictory memories of past violence in the area. Additionally, the role of the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches in (re)constructing memories and perceptions of history within the parishes shouldn't be underestimated.
The main strategies of coexistence in the local diverse communities of Subcarpathia, as I frame them, involve forgiving (personal reconciliation and forgiveness without forgetfulness), forgetting (oblivion, including deliberate nonremembering), and feigning (a strategy of silence). However, silence as the main strategy of coexistence can be applied to each. These strategies become visible through a number of behavioral patterns and religious expressions, but mostly in the modes of personal communication where various hints, lies, stereotypes, mutual traumas, but also perspectives on dialogue with the "domestic others" surface. It also seemed like local dwellers may be employing aspects of each category, simultaneously depending on the context in which they are performing (a conversation with me, conversations with neighbors, references to clergy, materialized attitudes to ambiguous monuments, etc.). Thus, the categories, weaving around one another in an inseparable manner, function more like a phenomenon of continued silent coexistence, inherited from the communist times. These are the grassroots cultural strategies that help somehow to reconcile mutual historical resentments that are experienced by various actors in diverse local communities in Subcarpathia. However, none of the three diplomatic strategies of coexistence successfully remove the basic reality that the Greek Catholic and Orthodox minorities living in Subcarpathia are surrounded by a Roman Catholic Polish majority, by whom they are exoticized and marginalized.
Thus, religion in the area serves as both a distinguishing factor (Roman Catholics vs. Orthodox and Greek Catholics) and a bridge ("at least we are all Christians").
